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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN MISSOURI*
JOHN S. DIVILBISS**
I. PLEADINGS
A. Affirmative Defense-Imputed Negligence
Petitions and answers are normally filed months before trial and often
before the lawyers have completed their investigations. Going to trial with-
out re-examining the pleadings has its perils.
In Siemes v. Englelardt,1 plaintiff, an employee of Union Electric,
was a passenger in a company truck being driven by a subordinate. The
truck collided with defendant's automobile and plaintiff sued for his
personal injuries. Defendant denied negligence and alleged the affirmative
defense of contributory negligence. After a verdict for plaintiff, defendant
appealed, complaining that plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction ignored
the defense of imputed negligence. Defendant argued that the truck driver
was negligent and, since the truck driver was plaintiff's subordinate, his
negligence should be imputed to plaintiff.
The court held that defendant's answer did not put imputed negli-
gence in issue, and therefore an instruction ignoring this defense was not
error.
Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 55.10 specifies twenty separate de-
fenses which must be raised affirmatively; it also requires an affirmative
plea as to "any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative de-
fense." Imputed negligence, though not one of the twenty enumerated
affirmative defenses, is included in this residual clause.
Defendant's affirmative plea of contributory negligence was directed
at plaintiff's conduct and not that of the truck driver. Defendant's denial
likewise failed to put imputed negligence in issue. A general denial
puts in issue all the material allegations necessary to support the
plaintiff's case, [and] the defendant may prove any fact which goes
to show that the asserted cause of action never had legal existence.
*This article contains a discussion of selected cases appearing in Volumes
345-356, South Western Reporter, Second Series.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 346 S.W.2d 560 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
(557)
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In other words, if the fact is one which tends to refute what the
plaintiff himself is bound to prove in the first instance, it is com-
petent to be shown as a general denial; . . . where the defendant
intends to rest his defense on some fact not included in the allega-
tions necessary to support plaintiff's case .. . he must plead the
same specifically or affirmatively in his answer as a condition
to the admissibility of such evidence at the trial.2
Plaintiff's case required no proof concerning the truck driver's con-
duct. If defendant wanted to inject the truck driver's negligence as an
issue, an affirmative plea was required. Such a defense, if successful, would
"avoid" liability as distinguished from destroying an element of plain-
tiff's prima facie case.
B. Striking Pleadings
A judge may sometimes strike the answer of a misbehaving defend-
ant, but non-payment of attorney fees and child-support pendente lite is not
such behavior as to justify this harsh action. Such was the holding in
Richnan v. Richman.8
The reluctant defendant, who suffered a default judgment after his
answer was stricken, raised the cry that due process of law had been de-
nied, and the Missouri Supreme Court agreed. The principle is neither new
nor novel, 4but the decision prompted a Missouri Bar Journal comment that,
"[T]he reasoning is broad enough to cast doubt upon Civil Procedure Rule
Rule 61 authorizes a court to strike the pleading of a party who fails to:
(1) answer interrogatories, (2) appear before one who is to take his deposi-
tion, (3) produce documents for inspection, (4) permit inspection of books
or premises, or (5) submit to a physical examination. The fear that the
Richman case has cast doubt on the validity of Rule 61 seems unfounded,
for the right to strike pleadings depends on the offense.
One of the earliest cases touching the due-process question was Hovey
v. Elliott,0 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1897. There
the defendant refused to pay a fund of money into court and the trial
judge struck his answer. The Supreme Court said that this denied defend-
2. Farley v. Farley, 181 S.W.2d 671, 673 (St. L. Ct. App. 1944).
3. 350 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1961).
4. See Annot., 62 A.L.R. 660, 667 (1929).
5. 18 J. Mo. B. 64 (1962).
6. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
[VoL 27
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ant due process of law, for although defendant was in contempt of court,
he was entitled to offer evidence on the merits of his case.
Striking the pleadings of a party who refuses to permit discovery is
entirely different. In Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkan-sas,7 the defendant
failed to produce required witnesses and records for pre-trial discovery. The
trial judge struck his answer and entered a default judgment. Defendant,
citing Hovey v. Elliott, argued that due process was denied. The Supreme
Court said:
Hovey v. Elliott involved a denial of all right to defend as a
mere punishment. This case presents a failure by the defendant to
produce what we must assume was material evidence in its pos-
session and a resulting striking out of an answer and a default.
The proceeding here taken may therefore find its sanction in the
undoubted right of the lawmaking power to create a presumption
of fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an answer begotten from
the suppression or failure to produce the proof ordered, when such
proof concerned the rightful decision of the cause. In a sense, of
course, the striking out of the answer and default was a punish-
ment, but it was only remotely so, as the generating source of
the power was the right to create a presumption flowing from the
failure to produce. The difference between mere punishment, as
illustrated in Hovey v. Elliott, and the power exerted in this, is
as follows: In the former due process of law was denied by the
refusal to hear. In this the preservation of due process was se-
cured by the presumption that the refusal to produce evidence ma-
terial to the administration of due process was but an admission of
the want of merit in the asserted defense."
The Court continued:
As the power to strike an answer out and enter a default . . . is
clearly referable to the undoubted right of the lawmaking authority
to create a presumption in respect to the want of foundation of
an asserted defense against a defendant who suppresses or fails
to produce evidence when legally called upon to give or produce,
our opinion is that the contention that the section was repugnant
to the Constitution of the United States is without foundation.9
The due process problem has never created much difficulty in Mis-
souri. The issue was raised in 1912 when a trial judge struck the answer
7. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
8. Id. at 350.
9. Id. at 353.
19621
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of a defendant who refused to give his deposition.1° Defendant argued that
this action violated the due process provisions of both the federal and
Missouri constitutions. The Missouri Supreme Court, quoting from Ham-
mond v. Arkansas,"1 said: "[Tihe power exerted below was like the au-
thority to default or take a bill for confessed because of a failure to answer
based upon a presumption that the material facts alleged or pleaded were
admitted by not answering . ...- ,2
This principle has been repeated in other opinions."' and seems to be
in no danger of being overturned at this time."' The Richiman case neither
expressly nor by implication limits the right of a court to strike the plead-
ings of a party who refuses to permit discovery.
C. Special Damages
Rule 55.21 of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure states: "When
items of special damages are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." The
lawyer who fails to plead special damages will, on proper objection, be
denied the right to introduce evidence of those damages."5 Just what dam-
ages are "special damages" has been a source of confusion, particularly in
the personal injury field.
Two 1962 cases demonstrate the problem. In Swan v. Stewart,"8 plain-
tiff, suing for personal injuries, tried to introduce proof that "traumatic
10. Miles v. Armour, 239 Mo. 438, 144 S.W. 424 (1912).
11. Supra note 7.
12. Miles v. Armour, supra note 10, at 448, 144 S.W. at 426.
13. In State ex rel. Williams v. Buzard, 354 Mo. 719, 190 S.W.2d 907 (1945)
(en banc), the court said: "The right to examine the adverse party... and to com-
pel him to answer, either in court or on depositions, both by penalties for contempt
and by striking his pleadings.., has long been established in this state." Id. at 724,
190 S.W.2d at 909.
In Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo. 442, 283 S.W.2d 483 (1945) (en banc), the
court said: "The law is that upon oral or written interrogatories being properly
propounded to discover relevant and material facts peculiarly and exclusively within
the knowledge of the party, his refusal to answer justifies striking his pleadings."
Id. at 447, 283 S.W.2d at 486.
See also State ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 116 S.W. 902
(1909), aff'd, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); Putney v. Du Bois Co., 240 Mo. App. 1075, 226
S.W.2d 737 (Spr. Ct. App. 1950).
14. A refusal to answer interrogatories going only to the issue of damages does
not justify striking the answer, although it would justify excluding testimony on
the secreted matter. See Mitchell v. Watson, 58 Wash.2d 206, 361 P. 2d 744 (1961),
37 WASH. L. REv. 175 (1962).
15. Chawkley v. Wabash Ry. Co., 317 Mo. 782, 297 S.W. 20 (1927) (en banc);
Conner v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 298 Mo. 18, 250 S.W. 574 (1923); Walquist v.
Kansas City Ry. Co., 292 Mo. 34, 237 S.W. 493 (1922).
16. 353 S.W.2d 805 (K.C. Ct. App. 1962).
[Vol. 27
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arthritis" and a "rheumatic condition" were caused by defendant's negli-
gence. Defendant made timely objection but was overruled. On appeal
the Kansas City Court of Appeals restated the time-worn rule that "the
test as to whether or not plaintiff can introduce evidence of 'rheumatism'
or 'traumatic arthritis' turns upon the question of whether or not those
complaints are shown to be 'the inevitable and necessary result of the
injuries alleged.' . . . It must be shown that the injuries not pleaded are
the necessary result of the injuries alleged." 7
Since plaintiff's petition had not alleged the arthritic and rheumatic
conditions, and since those conditions do not necessarily result from the
injuries plaintiff had alleged, the trial court erred in admitting proof of
arthritis and rheumatism.
One week later the supreme court dealt with the same problem in
Erbes v. Union Electric Co. 8 Plaintiff, burned by a severe electrical shock,
sued Union Electric and received a verdict. Defendant appealed alleging
that the trial court erred in admitting medical testimony that "plaintiff
suffered a lung 'blowout' which followed a pulmonary embolism and caused
death to a certain part of the right lung, for the reason that said evidence
was outside the scope of the pleadings."'1 Plaintiff's petition does not appear
in the decision, but the court said that "among other things the petition
alleged that plaintiff's 'internal organs and body' were permanently in-
jured."20
For those who have floundered in the quagmire of "special damage"
law, it is comforting to find the court confessing that "the decisions of
the appellate courts of this state do not appear to be in strict harmony ... "
To prove its point the court cites a long list of cases supporting plaintiff's
argument, followed by a nearly equal list of cases supporting defendant's
argument.
The court concluded that evidence of the lung damage was admissible
under the broad plea of permanent injury to the "internal organs." Three
reasons were given: "1. The petition alleged that plaintiff's 'internal organs'
had been permanently injured and, of course, his lung is an internal organ;
2. no motion to make more definite and certain was filed by defendant;
and 3. other evidence of the injury in question was admitted without ob-
17. Id. at 806.
18. 353 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1962).
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jection prior to the admission of the evidence of which complaint is now
made."21.
The court's first reason is somewhat difficult to follow. If a plea of
damaged "internal organs" permits proof of an injured lung because the
lung is an internal organ, a plea of injury merely to the body should also
suffice. The difficulty is that special damages are required to be "specifically
stated" and a broad claim of injured internal organs is simply not very
specific. The answer apparently lies in the court's second reason-defend-
ant failed to request a more definite statement and thus waived the pro-
tection offered by rule 55.21.
The requirement that special damages be "specifically stated" is said.
to be to protect defendants from surprise at trial, but even an "unsurprised"
defendant may on occasion keep out evidence of special damages not pleaded.
In Ziervogel v. Royal Packing Co.,22 decided by the St. Louis Court of
Appeals in 1949, the plaintiff offered proof that her injury had caused
high blood pressure. The defendant objected because the condition was
not specifically pleaded. But the defendant was not surprised. Defendant's
doctor had discovered the condition when he examined plaintiff, and plaintiff
had reported the malady to defendant's claim agent long before trial.
The trial judge admitted the evidence, but was reversed on appeal, the
court holding that evidence of the high blood pressure was inadmissible,
surprise or no surprise, because it had not been pleaded.
The court hinted that the outcome might have been different had
plaintiff, at trial, requested leave to amend her petition to include the claim
of high blood pressure. Missouri rule 55.53 permits a party to amend be-
latedly "by leave of court" and says that such "leave" shall be freely
given when justice so requires.23 As defendant was not "surprised," he was
probably prepared to meet the issue. If so, justice would seem to have re-
quired that the amendment be permitted even though trial had begun.
Though the law is in a state of some confusion, lawyers may avoid
most of the special damage problems. Plaintiffs can go over their medical
reports before trial, making certain that every injury on which they will
offer proof is specifically spelled out in the petition. If each injury is detailed,
the plaintiff will not thereafter need to argue that some injury "naturally
and necessarily" follows from something else. If some item of special dam-
21. Ibid.
22. 255 S.W.2d 798 (St. L. Ct. App. 1949).
23. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.33.
[Vol. 27
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss4/3
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN MISSOURI
age is accidentally omitted, plaintiff should ask leave to amend his petition
to include it. Unless it is clear that defendant will be prejudiced by the
late amendment, it should be granted .2
Defendants should make liberal use of the motion for a more definite
statement.25 When a plaintiff pleads injuries to "internal organs," defend-
ant should demand that plaintiff state precisely what internal organs were in-
jured and the extent of the injury. Defendant can thereby get full notice
of the claims plaintiff will make at trial.
II. DISCOVERY-SURVEILLANCE MOVIES
One thing certain to elevate the blood pressure of a trial lawyer is
the subject of pre-trial discovery. Such terms as "sporting theory of justice,"
"trial by ambush," and "concealment to expose perjury" are tossed about
with some emotion. And nothing produces the cry of "foul" more quickly
than the surveillance photographer who stalks his prey in the hope of
finding and filming some vigorous activity which belies the claimed injury.
Counsel for both plaintiff and defendant recognize that the case of a little
old lady, freshly bruised by a locomotive and claiming total paralysis, will
be weakened by a surveillance movie showing her riding a bicycle.
Are plaintiffs entitled to know whether such "gum shoe" productions
have been filmed? The Missouri Supreme Court recently said no.28 The
precise interrogatory under attack not only asked whether any photographs
or movies had been made, but also demanded copies. The trial judge
24. Federal rule 15a and Missouri rule 55.53 both provide that when a party
seeks leave to amend his pleading, "leave shall be given when justice so requires.'
In speaking of the federal rule, Moore says:
"[Ilf objection is made to the trial of an issue not raised by the pleadings,
an amendment is to be allowed to raise the issue, unless the objecting
party can show that he would be actually prejudiced, and even in that case
the court may permit the amendment and grant a continuance, so that the
objecting party can meet the new issue, and thus obviate the prejudice
which he would suffer if obliged to litigate the issue at that time."
3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 1f 15.02, at 805 (2d ed. 1948). The same philosophy
appears in Simpson v. Kansas City Connecting Ry. Co., 312 S.W.2d 113 (Mo,
1958) (en banc), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
25. The courts on several occasions have said that if defendants do not think
plaintiffs have pleaded their damages precisely enough, defendants should move
for a more definite statement. See Price v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 220 Mo. 435,
119 S.W. 932 (1909); Van Cleve v. St. Louis M. & S. E. Ry. Co., 124 Mo. App.
224, 101 S.W. 632 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907); Fuchs v. St. Louis Transit Co., 111
Mo. App. 574, 86 S.W. 458 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905). In each of these cases plaintiffs
successfully introduced evidence of injuries which did not necessarily result from
the injuries pleaded.




Divilbiss: Divilbiss: Practice and Procedure in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ruled that plaintiff could not have copies but was entitled to know whether
photographs or movies had been taken. A preliminary rule in prohibition
was then issued by the supreme court.
Defendant argued that the information requested was the attorney's
work product, long protected.27 The court agreed, saying:
Where the sole purpose of an inquiry is to procure the pro-
duction of material which, if it is in existence at all, is privileged,
we see no legitimate purpose in permitting the inquiry and prolong-
ing the controversy. We have held that such photographs as are
inquired about here would be privileged. We further hold that the
inquiry as to whether defendant had taken photographs or movies
of plaintiff during a seven year period was not a permissible
inquiry.28
The case is one of first impression in Missouri, and there is scant
authority from other jurisdictions. The court acknowledged that two
federal cases, McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp.29 and Harris v. Marine
Transp. Lines, Inc.,30 were "contrary in principle" to its decision. In the
McCall case, plaintiff took the deposition of the third party defendant's
attorney. The lawyer was required to tell whether he had any statements
of witnesses and to identify certain documents under his control. There
the court said: "The 'work product' doctrine does not apply to informa-
tion sought as to whether there was such 'work product' but only to the
information, if any, contained therein."31
In the Harris case, plaintiff requested copies of statements taken, and
photographs of the accident scene and the equipment involved. The con-
troversy centered on the right to examine. Plaintiff's right to determine the
existence of these materials was apparently not in issue.
A related problem arose in Florida in 1960.32 There plaintiff was aware
that a surveillance movie had been taken and at the pre-trial conference
moved for its production.3 3 Defendant refused, the trial judge ordered the
27. See for example Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); State ex rel.
Terminal Ry. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (1953) (en banc).
28. Supra note 26, at 25.
29. 16 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
30. 22 F.R.D. 484 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
31. Supra note 29, at 469.
32. Collier v. McKesson, 121 So.2d 673 (Fla. App. 1960).
33. Plaintiff relied on Burton v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 1 F.R.D. 571
(D.Ore. 1941). In that case plaintiff claimed an injury from muriatic acid
negligently left in a carboy by defendant. A new trial was granted because defendant
failed to disclose at the pre-trial conference his plan for a jury demonstration
[Vol. 27
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movie delivered, and the appellate court granted certiorari. The Florida
Court of Appeals, noting the absence of "any controlling authorities bear-
ing directly on" the problem before it, ruled that the movie was a work
product which need not be produced.
Courts have, on occasion, ordered the production of photographs for
inspection by opposing counsel, but not surveillance pictures.-' In general
the photographs ordered produced were those taken shortly after an accident,
giving one party information not available to his opponent from any other
source. The surveillance movie is an entirely different problem. A plaintiff,
better than anyone else, knows the degree of his disability. He needs no
preview of coming attractions to make out his case. Not all "surprise" frus-
trates justice. It is a weapon available to both plaintiffs and defendants to
expose exaggeration and fabrication.
showing that muriatic acid could not burn human flesh. The trial judge said:
"Parties are expected to disclose all legal and fact issues which they intend to raise
at trial, save only such issues as may involve privilege or impeaching matter. As
to these two exceptions disclosure may be made to the judge conducting the pre-
trial hearing without disclosure to opposing counsel, and a ruling will be made on
the exception claimed." Id. at 572.
34. In Lacoss v. Town of Lebanon, 78 N.H. 413, 101 Atl. 364 (1917),
plaintiff was injured by the breaking of a hoisting apparatus which was shortly
thereafter photographed by defendant. The court held that plaintiff was entitled
to discover defendant's photograph, although it was taken in preparation for trial.
The court said: "The test . . . is to inquire whether the facts they evidence are
relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action or whether they are merely matters of
defense." Id. at 365. Under such a test surveillance movies could not be discovered.
In De Vito v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 146 NY.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
aff'd, 159 N.Y.S.2d 468 (App. Div. 1957), defendant's railroad train collided with
plaintiff's decedent. Defendant purchased photographs of the accident scene from
a third party. The court held plaintiff was entitled to discover these photographs.
In Howe v. McBride, 193 Misc. 271, 84 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct. 1948), the
plaintiff was involved in an auto accident with defendant. All occupants in plain-
tiff's car were immediately taken to a hospital where they remained for a long
period. Before the vehicles were moved, defendant had photos taken of the scene.
Plaintiff was permitted to examine the photos because "the opportunity to secure
such photographs will never again exist." Id. at 273, 84 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85.
In Shields v. Sobelman, 64 F. Supp. 619 (E.D.Pa. 1946), plaintiff was injured
by a winch. Defendant's attorney, anticipating litigation, took a photographer to
the scene and supervised the photographing of certain parts of the machine which
had a bearing on liability. Plaintiff asked permission to inspect the photos, and
the court, with some hesitancy, granted his request. The court said: "In so holding,
I am not ruling generally that photographs taken by a lawyer, or under his direc-
tion and supervision, are never subject to privilege." Id. at 620.
In Cogdill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D.Tenn. 1947), plaintiff
was permitted to examine and copy photographs taken by defendant at the scene
of an auto accident, because due to "the circumstances of the accident and events
immediately following, defendant was in an advantageous position to take photo-
graphs . .." Id. at 415.
1962]
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III TRIAL-ARGUMENT
One of the most effective ways to argue damages for pain and suffer-
ing is to request an hourly or daily rate of compensation. A modest allow-
ance of fifty cents an hour produces $175,000 in damages for the plaintiff
with a forty year life expectancy. It is the very effectiveness (or over-
effectiveness) of the argument which causes some courts to prohibit its
use. 5
The first Missouri decision on the subject came in 1958, in Faught v.
Washw.6 There, counsel for plaintiff asked the jury to suppose they were
offered a lifetime job, working seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day,
with no vacations, and pay of three dollars a day. The job, counsel said,
was simply "to suffer [plaintiff's] disability." On appeal, the supreme court
said:
Whatever may be the cold logic or academic theory of the matter,
the ungilded reality is that such argument is calculated and de-
signed to implant in the jurors' minds definite figures and amounts
not theretofore in the record (and which otherwise could not get
into the record) and to influence the jurors to adopt those figures.
... If an argvmnt of this character is permissible and proper, it
would be just as logical, and equally as fair, to permit "expert
witnesses" to evaluate pain and suffering on a per diem or per
hour basis .... 87
Defendant also complained of the admission of several colored pho-
tographs of plaintiff's injuries and of the argument about the high salaries
paid baseball players-the point being somewhat irrelevant, defendant said,
as plaintiff was a service station attendant. In reversing plaintiff's judgment,
the court said: "Without undertaking to determine whether any single
35. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Botta v. Brummer, 26 N.J. 82, 101,
138 A.2d 713, 724 (1958), said:
Can defense counsel argue that pain and suffering are worth only $2.50
per day or $1 or any lesser sum? .... By doing so, he fortifies his adver-
sary's implication that the law recognizes pain and suffering as having been
evaluated and as capable of being evaluated on such basis . . . .When
the inequity of such trial procedure is considered along with the obvious
impropriety of attempting to substitute unproven, speculative and fanci-
ful standards of valuation for evidence, the duty to adjudge the illegality
of the proposal in its entirety is plain.
Among the jurisdictions which have ruled on the question, about half permit
such arguments. See 45 MARgUETTE L. REv. 289 (1961); 23 OHIo ST. L. J. 573(1962); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958).
36. 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
37. Id. at 603.
[Vol. 27
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matter of which we have treated, standing alone, would constitute reversible
error, . . .we are firmly of the opinion that, in their totality, they do."38
The mathematical formula argument was discussed in such strong
terms as to leave little doubt that it would have produced a reversal in
itself. Despite this warning, plaintiffs still make occasional excursions into
this dangerous but appealing area.
The recent cases of Corley v. Andrews- and Willis v. Rivernines IGA
Supermarkets40 represent rather ingenious efforts to avoid the effect of
the Faugkt case, while enjoying the benefits of a mathematical formula
argument. In the Corley case plaintiff asked a thousand dollars for past
pain and suffering and another thousand dollars for future pain and suffer-
ing. Then came the mathematical formula. Plaintiff's attorney produced a
large cardboard on which he wrote plaintiff's life expectancy multiplied by
fifty cents a day for "disability to plaintiff's thumb," fifty cents a day for
"inability to use his wrist," and two dollars a day "for his bad heart and
inability to do a full day's work."
Defendant objected to the cardboard display, but not the mathematical
formula, and his objection was overruled. The decision points out that
while the cardboard figures totaled $26,000, the jury awarded only $10,000,
and defendant did not complain that the verdict was excessive. Under
these circumstances, the court said, there was no prejudicial error in permit-
ting the use of the cardboard calculations.
One month after the Corley case the problem arose again in Willis v.
Rivermines IGA Supermarkets.41 Again the mathematical formula was
applied to physical disability rather than pain and suffering. Plaintiff
alleged that her injuries prevented or interfered with her housework and
ability to dress herself. Plaintiff had a life expectancy of eighteen years, or
6,570 days, and her lawyer argued that the jury should award at least two
dollars a day for plaintiff's disability. Defendant objected that the argu-
ment was improper and requested that the jury be discharged. The request
was denied. The jury awarded plaintiff $2,400, or less than one-fifth the
computed figure.
Defendant, relying on the Faught case, appealed because of the math-
ematical formula argument. But again there was no protest that the verdict
38. Id. at 604.
39. 349 S.W.2d 395 (St. L. Ct. App. 1961).
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was excessive. The court said: "[T]he argument, complained of by defend-
ant, could have affected the issue of .damages only and if we assume the
court erred in its ruling it was harmless. '42
If it is improper to use a mathematical formula for computing pain
and suffering, it seems equally improper to use such a formula for comput-
ing damages for the physical disability of a thumb, wrist or other anatom-
ical member, except where special expenses or lost earnings can be shown.
The Corley and Willis cases leave this question unanswered, but the risk
of reversal is such that plaintiffs may hesitate to test the issue further.
42. Id. at 444.
[Vol. 27
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